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Abstract
Most countries commonly classified as ‘in transition’ are still recognisably different
in several respects from other countries with a similar income per capita: a larger
share of their work force is in industry, they use more energy, have a more
extensive infrastructure and invest more in schooling. However, in terms of the
‘software’ necessary for a market economy, two groups emerge: the countries
that are candidates for EU membership seem to have partly completed the
transition. By contrast, the countries from the former Soviet Union that form the
CIS and the Balkan countries are still lagging behind, especially in terms of the
enforcement of property rights and the development of financial markets.1
1. Introduction
The economics of transition has become a sizeable cottage industry in the profession
and there is even a special international financial institution, the EBRD, which is supposed to
look after the special problems of countries in transition. Ten years after the start of reforms it
is time to ask whether this special treatment is still justified.
A number of existing studies analyze the prospects of transition economies to catch up
with developed market economies. Some have concentrated on estimating the time required
by transition countries to converge to the Western European level of development using a
growth regression approach (Barbone/Zalduendo, 1996); Fischer et al. (1997, 1998) and
Fischer/Sahay (2000) assess the “distance” of the CEECs from Western market economies in
terms of macroeconomic indicators such as inflation, budget deficit, etc., whereas Krkoska
(1999) examines whether the macroeconomic fluctuations in transition economies are similar to
those in Western European economies. The EBRD assesses regularly the progress of reform
in each of the CEECs (EBRD various years) and provides a quantitative evaluation in a
number of important areas (e.g. enterprise reform, market liberalization, financial and legal
institutions).
However, the existing literature takes much richer Western European OECD countries
as a model and implicitly assumes that all the characteristics that distinguish transition
economies (in Europe) are due to their past as centrally planned economies. This is unlikely to
be the case, because many of the indicators according to which transition countries differ from
OECD countries are known to be related to the development level of an economy. In other
words one should ask the question: Has central planning under communist rule left a heritage
that, even after ten years, differentiates post-communist economies from other countries with a
comparable income per capita?
The starting point for any post-transition Rip van Winkle would be those of the well
known characteristic traits
1 of centrally planned economies that might have left a mark on
economic structures because they could not be changed quickly:
Central planners had a marked preference for industry, especially heavy industry and
tended to neglect services.2
1. Central planners also organised very high rates of investment, both in physical and human
capital.
2. Under central planning there was no need for a financial system to allocate savings to
investment (done by the plan, usually without assigning a value to time).
3. Under central planning there was no need for the legal and institutional framework
underpinning a market economy.
This list leaves out many other elements that distinguish a centrally planned from a
market economy, for example the control over prices, non-market exchange rates and artificial
trade patterns to name but a few. However, these elements could be, and indeed have been
changed almost immediately and would thus today be unlikely to distinguish an economy in
transition today, ten years later.
The method proposed here starts from the observation that most of the elements in the
potential characteristics of economies in transition are in general related to the level of
development or income per capita.
2 For example, the demand for services tends to increase
with income. Richer countries therefore generally have a larger services sector. More
developed economies also have a much denser infrastructure than poorer ones. The same can
be said of the financial system, which is generally much more developed in richer countries.
Finally, it is a fact of life that in poorer countries the legal system tends to be under-developed,
and that the public sector tends to work less efficiently. The main reason for this might simply
be that the administration of the highly complex framework developed in the rich capitalist part
of the world relies on a public sector with a strong human capital base. However, it has also
been argued that weak enforcement of property rights impedes growth ( Dabla-
Norris/Freeman, 1999). Whichever way the causation runs is of no significant concern to the
purpose of our analysis.
The results presented here strongly confirm the general observation that most of the
elements that might distinguish an economy in transition are related to development. GDP per
capita (whether measured in PPP or in current $ terms) can alone explain between 40 to 70 %
of the variance of the indicators for the legacy of transition in simple cross-section regressions.
This suggests a simple research strategy. Formerly centrally planned economies could be said
                                                                                                                                                                                             
1 For a list of the variables used, see Appendix A.3.
2 See also Easterly (1999).3
to be different if they are systematically  outliers in regressions that link indicators like the
importance of industry, energy use, etc. to GDP per capita.
The next section briefly describes the indicators and data sources used. Section 3 then
presents the results. While section 3.1 discusses the sector-specific results and presupposes
that the CEECs are different by testing for the significance of regional dummy variables,
section 3.2 derives an overall assessment of the CEECs’ location vis-à-vis the rest of the
world. In contrast to the previous one, this section does not assume any a priori particularities,
but lets the data find the outliers itself. Section 3.3 briefly comments on the issue of the
transition economies’ adjustment towards the benchmark since 1990. Section 4 concludes.
2. Data
The data was taken from the World Bank Development Indicators data base which
contains income per capita and a number of structural indicators for 148 countries. In this
sample the transition countries mostly fall under the classification ‘Middle Income Developing
Countries’.
Most regressions were run on two transformations of the raw data: first, using the
natural logarithm of all variables and, second, using standardised values, i.e. by subtracting the
mean and then dividing by the standard deviation. As both sets of results were very similar;
only the results using logarithms are reported here. Income per capita can be measured and
compared in a common currency (the US-$) or in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. The
results presented here are based on GNP per capita in PPP, as this measure is commonly
used in cross-section comparisons. The results were again similar using GNP in US-$ terms.
This is not surprising since there is close correlation between these two measures of
development. In a regression of one on the other the R-2 is over 96 % and the transition
countries do not constitute outliers. This is a first indication that their economies are not
fundamentally different.
Four regional dummies were used throughout. Three for transition countries: CEE8
(Central Europe), encompassing the most advanced 8 countries, which are the most serious
candidates for EU membership (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Slovak Republic, and Slovenia), BALKAN, including Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia,4
and Romania, and the CIS  countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyztan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine).
The use of three different dummies was motivated by the fact that these groups of
countries differ markedly with respect to the extent of progress they have achieved in terms of
reforms towards a market economy. The CEE8 countries are generally perceived as the most
advanced country group, while the BALKAN countries have at least started reforms earlier
than the CIS countries did.
As a control group a dummy variable was added for ASEAN countries, which are also
widely perceived to have relied heavily on industrial expansion during their development
process.
3
The EBRD transition indicators were not used here for a simple reason: they are
available only for transition countries and are thus not useful to check whether transition
countries are different from other countries with a similar level of development.
3. Results
Section 3.1 presents the results of our methodology described above using a cross-
section of up to 148 countries with data from 1997 (in most cases). Each sub-section
examines the respective indicators in turn. In section 3.2 we derive a summary measure of the
countries’ location relative to the world-benchmark by aggregating the residuals of a
representative range of indicators. Finally, in section 3.3 we add a time dimension to our
perspective by examining whether the CEECs have been adjusting towards the benchmark
during their transition path.
3.1   A snapshot after(?) transition
The following sections comment on the results given in table A1. As described in section
2, these are taken from the following type of regression:
(1) Indicatori = a + b GNPpci + c (GNPpci)
2 + f CEE8 + g BALKAN + h CIS + j ASEAN + ei
                                                
3 The ASEAN dummy comprises: Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Phillipines, Singapore, Thailand
and Vietnam.5
with ‘i’ as the country-subscript, ‘Indicator’ as the respective variable that is related to per
capita income (‘GNPpc’), ‘CEE8’, ‘BALKAN’, ‘CIS’ and ‘ASEAN’ as the country
dummies described above, and ‘e’ as the error-term. All variables are in natural logarithms so
that the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. The square term of per capita GNP was
added to allow for a non-linear relationship. When the coefficient of the per capita GNP
square term was not significant at the 10%-level, this variable was dropped from the equation.
Occasionally, the classification of the dummies may disguise underlying country heterogeneity.
In order to control for such cases, we supplemented the results from table A1 with CEEC-
country-specific results by running the following regressions:
(2) Indicatori = a + b GNPpci + c (GNPpci)
2 + n COUNTRY + ei
Specification (2) differs from (1) only in replacing the four regional dummies by a single
dummy named ‘COUNTRY’, which includes but one transition country in each single
regression. All other transition countries are left out of the entire sample, so as to ensure that
the benchmark is not distorted by the (allegedly) distorted transition economies. Given that
there are 24 transition economies in our sample and 18 regressions in table A1, we had to run
18*24=432 regressions to get the coefficients for all transition countries for all indicators
examined in table A1 alone. The results of this exercise are summarised in table A2, which
contains the coefficients of the respective CEEC as well as their heteroscedasticity-consistent
t-values. Whenever these country-specific results add to the informative value of the dummy
coefficients under specification (1), they are referred to in the text below.
3.1.1 Industrial structure
The preference of central planners for industry suggests the question whether post
communist economies today are still characterized by more industry (and less services) than
would be 'normal' given their level of income.
4 One would expect that the share of industry
                                                
4 This approach rests ultimately on the „Chenery-Hypothesis“ (Chenery 1960), according to which sectoral
growth within an economy is linked to its per capita income level. For an earlier application to Eastern
Europe, but with a different focus than ours, see Doehrn/Heilemann (1991).6
initially increases as a country grows richer, because the work force typically shifts out of
agriculture into the secondary sector. At high levels of income, i.e. when mainly services
expand, further increases in income should not lead to more employment in industry, so that
the relationship between income and employment in industry should resemble an inverted J.
Therefore, the square of income per capita was added to the explanatory variables in the
following regressions.
The importance of industry in an economy can in principle be measured by the share in
employment or in economy-wide value added (GDP). Both indicators were used here.
a)  Employment shares:
  As for employment shares the evidence is strong, but the latest available data set is
based on the most recent available data from the years 1990-97. Unfortunately, the data for
the CEECs are usually no later than from 1994, which is still only five years after the start of
transition. There is a very close correlation between GNP per capita and the share of industry
in employment in the non-linear way described above, but the transition countries clearly do
not fit this line. The dummy variables for the three groups of transition countries are positive
and highly significant. The point estimates (between 0.5 and 0.8) indicate that the share of
industry in employment in transition countries is between one half and about twice as large as
one would expect given their income.
 
b)  Value added shares:
Interestingly, the results are quite different if we look at the share of industry in value
added, i.e. GDP. The dummy variables for the three groups of transition countries turn out to
be insignificant for all transition dummies.
5 It is interesting to note that the dummy for ASEAN
becomes significantly positive, which it is not for employment shares.
6
The results on services are not reported because they represent, as one would expect, a
mirror image of the ones for industry: the employment share of services is clearly lower for
                                                
5 Unfortunately, the value added regression shows a comparatively poor overall fit.
6 Somewhat surprising the results concerning the share of manufacturing in value added were different: the
dummy variables for both groups of transition countries are large and highly significant. Unfortunately, no
employment data are available for manufacturing.7
CIS countries, but much less for the CEE8 and BALKAN. As for the shares in value added
neither dummy is significant.
7
The difference in the results for shares in employment and GDP suggests that most
transition economies still have a problem with structural adjustment. The number of workers in
industry is still much higher than one would expect, but their productivity is relatively low, so
that the share of industry in GDP is about normal.
The legacy of the preference of central planners for heavy industry is more difficult to
measure since it is difficult to define heavy industry precisely and there is very little consistent
cross-country data on the composition of industrial output. However, the fact that heavy
industry in general is more intensive in energy suggests an indirect way to measure its
importance, namely by measuring the energy intensity of the economy.
  8 The best indicator
available in this respect is commercial energy use (which eliminates the part of energy used by
households, which could be affected by climate). The square of income per capita was again
added to the explanatory variables for the reasons outlined above.
9 The square term was
highly significant, but the size and significance of the dummies for transition countries was not
affected by this addition.
As for this indicator the results are unequivocal: in either group of transition countries
commercial energy usage is much higher than expected. The three dummy variables are highly
significant and the magnitude of the point estimate (around 0.8 for CEE8 and CIS) indicates
that transition economies consume about twice as much energy per unit of GDP as one would
                                                
7 This conclusion is in some contrast to the results of the recent Transition Report (EBRD, 1999), which
identifies two adjustment patterns: In a first group of countries, including Central Europe, the Baltic states
and the western parts of the CIS, the employment share of industry has declined, while the share of
services – market services in particular – has increased. By 1997, this group had virtually closed the
‘service gap’ relative to a benchmark of 41 developing and developed market economies amounting to
around 10% of total employment at the start of the transition. In the remaining group of countries,
including south-eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, the reallocation has been mainly from
industry to agriculture, though in some of these countries, services have increased their share as well.
Relative to the benchmark, the share of industry in total employment remains high in most countries, but
has fallen below the benchmark level in the Caucasus and in Central Asia.
8 It is well documented that the Soviet model of industrialisation, as it had been adopted by all former
CMEA countries, lead to excessive energy intensity (see Gray, 1995).
9  At high levels of income, i.e. when only services expand, further increases in income should not
necessitate more energy, so that the relationship between income and commercial energy use should
resemble an inverted J8
expect. The fact that the BALKAN dummy is smaller and less significant is due to the
influence of Albania consuming significantly less than expected energy.
Could the higher use of energy in transition countries be due to the large industrial
sector? This does not seem to be the case. The size and significance of the dummies for the
transition countries does not change if the share of industry in value added is included.
10
3.1.2 Capital investment
Central planners organised very high rates of investment, both in physical and human
capital.
a)  Physical capital:
The heavy investment in physical capital might have left a legacy in terms of the part of
infrastructure that depreciates very slowly, like roads and rail networks. This is indeed the
case. The quality of road network (proxied by the length of all paved roads as a share in
surface area
11) and the extension of the rail network (in km per surface area), are both closely
related to income. But the countries in transition obviously constitute outliers in the sense that
the dummy variables are highly significant and their point estimates suggests that they have a
rail network that is approximately twice as extensive as one would expect.
b) Human capital:
12
As for human capital, the strong investment seems to have continued. In regressions with
gross secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios the dummy for the transition countries are highly
significant and the point estimates suggest again that, given their income levels, countries in
transition are characterised by enrolment ratios that are substantially higher than (more than
                                                
10 See table A.3. As one would expect, the share of industry in employment is not significant in predicting
commercial energy use. However, it is only in this respect that transition countries are over-industrialised.
11 For similar evidence on the cross-country relationship between road infrastructure and income see
Querioz/Gautman (1992) and Ingram/Li (1997). For the rail-income relationship see also Canning (1999).9
twice as high as) suggested by their development level.
13 In all these cases the dummy for
ASEAN countries is not significant, suggesting that investment in infrastructure and human
capital was not a particularly strong point of these economies.
3.1.3 Financial system
Under central planning there was no need for a financial system to allocate savings to
investment. Everything used to be done by the plan, largely without assigning a value to time.
The size of the financial sector is captured by two indicators: the ratio of M2 to GDP (to
measure the size of the banking system) and the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP (to
measure the financing available for investment in the private sector).
14
At first sight, the M2/GDP ratio only partly confirms the impression that transition
countries are characterised by less developed financial systems. Only the dummy variable for
the CIS countries is very significantly negative
15, while the other transition dummies are
insignificant, but still negative. Closer examination of the country-specific differences reveals
that in the case of the CEE8 dummy the Czech and the Slovak Republic have a larger than
expected banking sector whereas the opposite is true for the others.
16
The second indicator (credit to the private sector as a % of GDP) might be more
relevant as it does not include financing of the government. It confirms that CIS countries’
financial systems are clearly less developed than other countries at similar income levels. In this
case again, the dummy for the BALKAN countries is much smaller than that for the CIS, but
                                                                                                                                                                                             
12 Human capital – measured by school enrolment rates – ranks among the most robust determinants of
economic growth according to Levine/Renelt (1992).
13 Beside education, health constitutes an important element of human capital. As several authors have
shown (e.g. Pritchett/Summers, 1996; Suhrcke, 1999) it is also closely related to per capita income across
countries. Running the same regressions as above, but for various health input and output measures,
reveals a very similar pattern as for the education variables: All transition dummies suggest a significantly
better level of health, mainly due to significantly more resources devoted to the health sector.
14 The importance of the financial sector for economic growth has been demonstrated by Levine (1997). For
a similar approach as ours, see EBRD (1998).
15 The 1997 data used here does not even incorporate the effects of the 1998 crisis in Russia.
16 Apart from Albania, which biases the significance upwards, financial indicators have only been available
for two other BALKAN countries, i.e. Bulgaria and Croatia. The results here are broadly similar to those
given in EBRD (1999).10
yet greater than the CEE8 dummy.
17 In contrast to the M2/GDP regression, all transition
dummies are negatively significant at conventional levels.
The spread between lending and deposit rates may serve as an adequate indicator of the
efficiency of the financial system. In the CIS countries this spread is significantly higher than
one would expect, whereas the insignificant results for the other two dummies do again hide
substantial country-specific differences. As for BALKAN, a relatively low spread in Albania
accounts for this result, while the picture is very mixed among the CEE8 countries. Hungary
seems to have an extra-ordinarily efficient financial system compared to its income level,
whereas Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia is significantly worse off, and the Czech Republic,
Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia appears to fit well into the world pattern.
In sum, even though a few of the more advanced countries in Central Europe may have
established a rather developed financial system, the majority is still relatively backward in this
regard, not to mention the CIS and most of the BALKAN countries, which are even further
off the benchmark.
3.1.4 Legal and institutional framework
Under central planning there was no need for the legal and institutional framework
underpinning a market economy. Are countries in transition different because they have not yet
been able to create the institutional framework for a market economy?
 18
It is often argued that corruption is an important obstacle to FDI and growth and that
many countries in transition have a serious corruption problem. Surprisingly, this is not
confirmed by the data. It is difficult to measure how widespread and serious corruption is.
There exists, however, an indicator, which is based on a systematic survey by Transparency
International. Corruption is apparently tightly related to income. Differences in GDP per capita
alone explain 60 % of the variability in the corruption index. However, in terms of the dummy
variables used, only the BALKAN countries do constitute negative outliers in this relationship.
                                                
17 Qualitatively similar results obtain for indicators measuring capital market development, such as the
stock market capitalisation as a share in GDP, where the point estimate of the dummy coefficients is even
larger.
18 The role of the institutional framework in determining development prospects has increasingly attracted
attention within the framework of the economic growth literature (e.g. Knack/Keefer, 1995).11
This suggests that corruption is not a problem that is specifically worse for the other transition
countries. Regarding the result for CIS we note that this comprises Russia (significantly more
corrupt) and Belarus (within predicted range of corruption) turning the overall dummy
insignificant, though negative. The picture is even more diverse within the CEE8 countries: The
Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia seem to be significantly worse off, in sharp
contrast to Hungary and Poland that are positive outliers in the country-specific regression.
How can one measure the quality of the institutional framework? There are several
financial institutions that provide indicators of country risk. These indicators provide a measure
of the risks faced by foreign investors (that the local government will interfere, for example
with an expropriation, or that contracts will not be respected by local partners). Table A.1
presents the results using the index provided by ‘Institutional Investor’. There is again a very
strong correlation with income per capita, but a clear distinction between the three groups of
transition countries seems to emerge. The dummy for the Central Europeans is not significant,
but it is negative and significant for both the BALKAN and the CIS dummy, with a greater
magnitude associated with the latter
19.
The indices provided by two other institutions (Euromoney and Political Risk Services)
yield slightly different results concerning the CEE8 dummy, which enters with a significantly
positive sign. As for the Euromoney country risk index, only Slovakia and Slovenia turn out to
be within the expected range, while the remaining CEE8 countries are all better off. The ICRG
indicator is only available for a few transition economies.
20
The dummy for the ASEAN control group is always positive and significant.
A similar results obtains by using the ‘Index of Economic Freedom’ (Heritage
Foundation), which is supposed to measure the degree to which market forces are free to act
on their own. This index is again closely related to income per capita, but the BALKAN and
                                                
19 Again, the widest intra-dummy differences relate to the CEE8 countries: Hungary, Lithuania, Slovenia,
and Slovakia fare worse, Estonia and Latvia seem in line with predictions, and Poland appears better than
expected.
20 Among the CEE8 countries Hungary, Poland and Slovakia show a better performance than expected, and
the Czech Republic seems to fit well into the predicted pattern. The CIS dummy only contains Russia, and
BALKAN includes Albania, Bulgaria and Romania, all of which are significantly riskier than expected.12
CIS countries realise values that are statistically worse than expected taking into account even
their low level of income
21. However, this is not the case for the CEE8s on average.
On average, there does seem to be a clear divide between the more advanced countries
that constitute the most serious candidates for EU enlargement and the rest of the region,
notably the BALKAN and CIS countries. Certainly for the latter, transition cannot be said to
be over.
22
Thus far, we have focused on a sector-by-sector analysis. In the following section, our
intention is to derive a summary assessment of the overall location of the CEECs over the
indicators presented above and to check whether other countries that seem to be similar to the
transition countries.
3.2 A fishing expedition
So far we have started from the knowledge which countries did have a central planning
past.  But our approach could also be used to provide a fishing net for a hypothetical visitor
from Mars who wants to identify countries with a central planning past without any knowledge
of earthen history. We will show that all this visitor would need would be some presumption
about the preferences of central planners, as outlined above, to identify countries with a central
planning past or (see below) present.
                                                
21 In the country-specific analysis of the CIS economies, it is surprising to note that Moldova has
established a greater degree of freedom than expected. The grouping again hides striking inter-country
differences: The Czech Republic and Estonia have a higher degree of freedom, while Hungary, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia are less free then predicted, and Latvia is within the ‘normal’ range.
22 Another indicator of the extent to which reforms have led to a normal market economy environment
could be the importance of trade in GDP. The central planners had a preference for trade within their own
block and tried to minimise dependency from trade with capitalist (i.e. OECD) countries. Whether this
regional preference has disappeared is difficult to test with the methodology used here as one would have
to take into account the vicinity of major markets and other ‘gravitational’ factors. However,  Brenton
(1999) confirms the judgement that in this respect the transition is over for countries in Central Europe.
Gravity equations of the distribution of trade of transition countries indicate that the Central Europeans
trade approximately as much with their western trading partners as one would expect given income levels
and distance. However, this is not the case for countries of the Former Soviet Union countries, which still
show a statistically significant bias to trade more among themselves than one would expect from the
gravity factors (distance, market size).13
In order to provide the fishing net we proceeded as follows: We first selected a smaller, but
representative set of indicators from each sector in 3.1
23 (male industry employment,
commercial energy use, paved roads, secondary school enrolment, M2 as a share in GDP,
interest spread, Euromoney creditworthiness indicator, and the Index of Economic Freedom).
We regressed these indicators as usual on GNP per capita and - if significant - its square term.
After standardising the residuals of each regression (i.e. subtracting the mean and dividing by
the standard deviation), we calculated the average of each country’s standardised residual
across the selected indicators.
24 This average was again standardised to get our final aggregate
measure. Given a standard-normal distribution we were then able to identify the  outlier-
countries. Table A4 reports those countries in the lower and upper 5% percent of the
distribution. The countries in the upper percentile are of most interest to us, since they
constitute the country group that tends to have more of the central planning characteristics than
their development level suggests. The result is telling: the upper 5% – a total of 13 countries –
is largely made up of transition countries, in particular those who are further behind in reforms
towards the market, i.e. the BALKAN and CIS countries
25. Only three non-transition
countries, i.e. the Democratic Republic of Congo
26, Cuba, and Guinea-Bissau, seem to be
comparable to these 10 transition countries. Notably, two of them are communist states or led
by autocratic rule. The probability of such a result (i.e. to find 10 formerly centrally planned
economies among the 13 outliers representing the upper 5%-percentile) in a random drawing
is approximately
27 2.4*10
-11.
Except for Kyrgyzstan and Moldova, which are known to be more reform-minded, one can
thus identify without any prior knowledge the entire CIS from its central planning past.
                                                
23 The results do carry over two the entire set of indicators, too.
24 Before doing so all residuals had to be arranged so that a positive residual meant a higher actual
development level (regarding the respective indicator) than predicted by per capita income. Therefore, the
residuals of the interest rate spread and the economic freedom-indicators, which are inversely related to
per capita income, had to be multiplied by (-1).
25 The transition countries are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Ukraine.
26 Which is not exactly ‘democratic’ in fact.
27 This is an approximation (using the binomial distribution probability with 13 as the number of
independent trials, 10 as the number of successes in trials and 0.05 as the probability of success in each
trial) as we are assuming the countries to be drawn independently.14
The lower 5 % of the distribution did not contain any transition countries.
Considering the transition countries alone, it is interesting to note that the extent of
reform efforts is strongly related to the size of the residuals, as it is shown in figure AF1: The
more successful a transition country has been in terms of reform policy (measured by the
EBRD transition indicator), the more it conforms with the world-wide benchmark.
Hence, this approach - which does not impose any a priori judgement on whether the
CEECs are different, but starts only with knowledge about the preferences of the socialist
planner - corroborates our findings from section 3.1, that we have derived by a priori
assuming that the transition countries were different and by therefore assigning dummy
variables to them. Some of the CEECs are indeed still easily recognisable merely by looking at
the cross-section of all countries in the world in 1997. This implies that the old legacies have
persisted particularly in the less advanced CEECs, which are still far from becoming ‘ordinary’
market economies.
3.3 A note on the adjustment over time
So far, we have only taken a snapshot at one point in time. It would be interesting to see
how the legacy of central planning has evolved over time.
Unfortunately, the limited availability of the indicators for the early years of transition
prevents an encompassing comparison of 1990 and 1997. In addition, the physical
infrastructure indicators (road and rail network) do not change significantly in such a short time
period. For these reasons, we could re-run the regressions only for a limited subset of
indicators (i.e. industry employment, industry value added, manufacturing value added,
commercial energy use, secondary and tertiary enrolment rates). The results concerning the
industry data essentially confirm our earlier results: the 'over-manning' in industry found so far
for all transition countries is the result of a divergent evolution of the shares of industry in
employment and value added: the value added shares have dropped since the start of
transition, but employment has declined very little.  The results on energy efficiency reveal an
improvement of efficiency over time, hence a move towards the benchmark.15
The individual regression results as well as the results on the percentage changes in the
respective indicators between 1990 and 1997 are available from the corresponding author
upon request.
4. Concluding remarks
The question implicit in our analysis was: would it be possible for an economist without
any access to time series data to distinguish the formerly centrally planned economies among
the over 130 countries in the world? The answer seems to be yes. Even after 10 years, most
countries in transition are still characterised by a much higher share of employment in industry
and a higher energy use than expected on the basis of their income per capita. They also have
a much more extensive physical infrastructure and have a higher proportion of their population
in secondary and tertiary education. However, considering indicators that measure the extent
to which the institutional framework of a market economy has been put into place leads to
more differentiated results. The financial and institutional framework for a market economy
clearly is much weaker than one would expect for the CIS and BALKAN countries, whereas
this is not the case for the advanced Central European countries. For some of the latter (i.e.
the ten candidates for EU membership minus Bulgaria and Romania) there is even some partial
evidence that their framework is stronger than one would expect given their still relatively low
level of income per capita. Significant differences remain, of course, within this group. But on
average it seems that the transition is over in Central Europe.
For these countries, 10 years were enough to upgrade the economic software, even if
the hardware is still recognisably from a different era. However, this raises the question why
these countries should still be treated differently from other developing countries with a similar
income per capita (e.g. Turkey or Brazil), for example by being served by a special
development bank, the EBRD. The countries in the CIS (and some from the Balkans) are
clearly in a different category. They still have problems with the transition towards credible
market based institutions and financial systems. Will they need another decade to catch up?16
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Appendix
Table A.1: Regression Results
GNPpcP
PP
GNPpc^
2
CEE8 Balkan CIS ASEAN R2 Obs
1) Industry male
employment 97
2.06**
(2.5)
-0.10**
(2.0)
0.53****
(6.4)
0.60****
(5.9)
0.83****
(11.2)
-0.16*
(-1.7)
0.68 131
2) Industry female
employment 97
4.31****
(5.1)
-
0.23****
(-4.6)
0.85****
(8.3)
1.08****
(6.9)
1.25****
(10.9)
0.37****
(3.3)
0.70 130
3) Industry value added
% of GDP 97
1.46****
(3.0)
-
0.08****
(-2.9)
0.06
(1.1)
-0.11
(-0.9)
0.07
(0.8)
0.18**
(2.4)
0.24 120
4) Manufacturing value
added % of GDP 97
1.24**
(2.4)
-0.06**
(-2.0)
0.34***
(3.7)
0.22***
(3.1)
0.38*
(1.8)
0.50****
(6.5)
0.33 110
5) Commercial energy use
p.c. kg of oil equivalent
96
0.81****
(18.8)
0.67****
(6.4)
0.36
(1.2)
0.77***
(3.2)
-0.04
(-0.3)
0.76 109
6) Commercial energy use
p.c. kg oil equiv. 96
-1.64**
(-2.5)
0.14****
(3.8)
0.82***
(6.6)
0.53*
(1.7)
0.86****
(3.5)
0.03
(0.3)
0.79 109
7) Paved roadnet (% of all
roads) (a)
1.20****
(12.9)
1.50***
(2.8)
1.21****
(9.5)
1.57****
(8.5)
0.44
(0.9)
0.80 117
8) Railnet (km per surface
area) (a)
0.71****
(11.3)
1.42****
(11.4)
1.34****
(11.4)
1.08****
(4.8)
-
0.97****
(-2.8)
0.73 116
9) Gross secondary
enrolment 96
0.58****
(14.5)
0.46****
(5.8)
0.46****
(5.9)
0.96****
(10.2)
0.11
(0.6)
0.76 119
10) Gross tertiary
enrolment 96
1.03****
(24.5)
0.56**
(2.9)
0.93****
(6.8)
1.56****
(9.3)
0.13
(0.5)
0.81 130
11) M2 % GDP 97 0.41****
(-10.4)
-0.18
(-1.3)
-0.18
(-0.7)
-
0.93****
(-6.8)
0.29*
(1.8)
0.55 125
12) Credit to private
sector % of GDP 97
0.72****
(13.2)
-0.45**
(-2.6)
-0.71*
(-1.9)
-
1.09****
(-4.2)
0.65****
(2.7)
0.63 126
13) Interest rate spread
lending – deposit 97
-
0.36****
(-6.7)
0.04
(0.3)
0.61
(1.3)
0.66**
(2.9)
-0.64***
(-3.1)
0.41 95
14) Corruption (higher
value = less corrupt) 98
0.38****
(10.7)
-0.03
(-0.3)
-
0.24****
(-5.1)
-0.24
(-1.5)
-0.14
(-1.2)
0.63 80
15) Euromoney country
risk index 97
0.38****
(21.4)
0.11****
(3.3)
-0.25*
(-1.9)
-0.27***
(-3.0)
0.2**
(2.1)
0.77 129
16) Institutional investor
country risk index 97
0.48****
(18.4)
-0.04
(-0.6)
-0.32**
(-2.0)
-0.52***
(-3.2)
0.32****
(4.2)
0.81 108
17) ICRG country risk
index 97
0.12****
(10.1)
0.05**
(2.5)
-
0.16****
(-7.2)
-0.03**
(-2.3)
0.05**
(2.5)
0.60 103
18) Economic Freedom 99
(higher value = less free)
-
0.16****
(-11.4)
0.03
(0.6)
0.16****
(6.4)
0.18****
(5.3)
-0.02
(-0.2)
0.62 123
Source: Own calculations. All variables are in logarithm. All standard errors are corrected
heteroskedasticity-consistent. The symbols: *, **, ***, **** indicate coefficients that are significant at
the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% level, respectively. (a) Additional explanatory variable: population density. p.c.
stands for per capita.18
Table A.2: Single country dummies and t-values*
1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9
Indu Indu Indu Manu Energy Road Rail Second.
Alb 0.47 0.9 -0.45 -0.38 1.12 1.21 0.2
8.8 10.3 -11.2 -6.3 7.3 9.9 3.2
Arm 0.97 1.47 0.22 0.57 -0.2 1.16 1.19 0.97
17.8 16.5 5.3 9 -3.2 7.9 10 17.4
Az 0.98 1.32 -0.36 0.4 1.28 1.66 1.11
14.7 15 -7.9 6.8 21.4 13 15.3
Bel 0.62 0.99 0.33 0.83 0.96 0.9 1.21 0.62
9.4 10.6 7.3 12.3 13.5 9 13.9 16.1
Bul -0.17 0.15 1.25 1.35 1.53 0.56
-3.9 2.2 18.1 12.5 16.3 13
Cro 0.44 0.72 -0.23 0.21 0.42 1.2 1.5 0.48
6.72 7.8 -5.14 3.1 5.9 11.5 16.2 12.7
Cz 0.54 0.76 0.73 0.47 1.66 0.24
11.7 11.1 11.8 3.7 15.7 6.5
Est 0.66 0.9 -0.12 0.04 1.39 1.17 1.2 0.7
10.1 9.8 -2.7 0.6 19.6 11.1 13.6 18.7
Mac 0.69 1.36 -0.11 1.13 1.29 0.48
11.7 14.6 -2.5 9.8 13.1 9.8
Geo 0.9 1.15 -0.18 0.31 -0.54 2.04 1.44 0.96
16.6 13.4 -4.4 5.2 -9.2 14.3 12.6 15
Hun 0.41 0.73 0.06 0.38 0.68 1.21 1.68 0.46
6.64 8.5 1.3 6 9.9 10.9 17.3 13.4
Kaz 0.56 0.79 -0.12 1.33 1.68 0.88 0.74
9.1 8.5 -2.8 19.5 8.8 6.4 16.1
Kyr 0.61 1.07 -0.2 0.28 0.2 1.8 -0.48 0.92
11.4 12.3 -5 4.6 3.3 13.7 -4.6 15.3
Lat 0.75 1 0 0.3 0.76 4.03 1.8 0.83
11.7 10.6 0.03 4.4 10.8 38.8 20.4 14.8
Lit 0.73 1.01 0.03 0.29 1.1 2.55 1.4 0.63
11.3 10.7 0.6 4.3 15.6 25.1 15.8 15.2
Mol 0.98 1.58 0.32 0.85 0.91 2.1 1.95 1.19
13.9 17.7 6.7 14.6 15 11.5 13.9 16
Pol 0.51 0.5 0.2 0.86 1.17 1.62 0.5
7.9 5.7 4.4 12.4 10.2 16.1 14.4
Rom 0.84 1.15 0.37 0.89 1.09 1.54 0.52
12.9 12.2 8.1 12.7 9.7 15.8 12.6
Rus 0.74 1.02 0.17 1.61 1.23 1.1 0.63
11.3 10.8 3.8 22.9 7.3 9 15.3
Slk 0.22 0.66 0.03 0.83 1.49 0.35
3.7 8.2 0.6 12.5 15.1 10.2
Slv 0.47 0.83 0.21 0.49 0.35 -0.47 1.04 0.08
12.2 13 5.1 8.3 5.8 -3.8 10 2.2
Ta 0.97 1.47 0.44 1.24 0.29 1.31
9.6 13.9 6 7.2 2.2 15.5
Tu 0.87 0.99 1.83 1.1
12 11 29.8 8.2
Ukr 1.04 1.46 0.35 -0.81 1.74 1.81 1.86 1.07
19.5 16.8 8.7 -13.3 29 12.9 16.4 17.619
Table A.2 continued
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Tertiary M2% Credit% Spread Corrupti Eurom. InstInv ICRG Freedo
Alb 0.74 0.65 -1.5 -0.19 -0.55 -0.78 -0.18 0.12
10.3 11 -17.3 -2.2 -16.5 -17.1 -9.2 7.3
Arm 0.66 -1.29 -1.12 1.23 -0.44 0.09
9.7 -23.3 -13.7 15.1 -14 5.5
Az 1.6 -0.86 -1.81 -0.26 0.29
19.4 -12.7 -18.1 -6.7 15.9
Bel 1.29 -1.16 -1.25 0.91 -0.01 -0.56 -0.96 0.3
22.8 -23.3 -18 12.6 -0.3 -24.1 -31.2 17.9
Bul 1.45 -0.55 -0.71 1.66 -0.23 -0.21 -0.41 -0.18 0.2
24.4 -11 -9.8 22.5 -5 -8.2 -11.7 -13 12.5
Cro 0.81 -0.28 -0.12 0.55 0.03 -0.11
14.4 -5.7 -0.2 7.6 1.2 -3.6
Cz -0.17 0.3 0.25 0.11 -0.1 0.05 0.01 -0.21
-2.8 5.2 3.3 1.4 -2.5 2.7 1 -8.8
Est 1.18 -0.41 -0.2 0.76 -0.35 0.09 -0.03 -0.18
21.1 -8.1 -2.9 10.5 8.4 3.8 -1 -10.8
Mac 0.83 -0.62
13.2 -21.9
Geo 2.12 -0.75 -0.93 0.16
28.5 -21.5 -19 9.4
Hun 0.33 -0.13 -0.57 -0.58 0.1 0.18 -0.11 0.05 0.08
6 -2.5 -8.2 -7.8 2.5 9.1 4.4 4.9 3.9
Kaz 1.29 -1.31 -1.52 0.02 -0.28
21.3 -25.7 -20.6 0.7 -7.8
Kyr 0.82 0.12 -0.59 0.21
11.4 1.4 -17.6 12.9
Lat 1.2 -0.38 -0.89 0.3 -0.31 0.2 -0.03 0.002
20.4 -7.6 -12.4 4 -6.8 8 -1 0.1
Lit 1.09 -0.8 -1.03 -0.06 0.17 -0.1 0.06
18.8 -16.1 -14.4 -0.8 6.8 -3 3.7
Mol 2.02 -0.2 -0.55 -0.02 0.13 -0.03
24.1 -2.8 -5.3 -0.2 3.2 -1.8
Pol 0.36 -0.21 -0.72 -0.04 0.04 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.15
6.6 -4.1 -10.5 -0.6 1 7.8 5.9 8.9 7.8
Rom 0.76 -0.65 -0.23 0.04 -0.02 -0.12 0.16
13.2 -12.9 -5.3 1.7 -0.7 -9.6 9.6
Rus 1.34 -0.82 -1.15 0.81 -0.45 0.02 -0.24 -0.03 0.23
23.2 -16.4 -16.3 11.1 -10.4 1 -7.3 -2.5 14
Slk 0.08 0.33 0.03 -0.05 -0.2 -0.02 -0.05 0.03 0.15
1.4 6.2 0.4 -0.6 -5.3 -0.8 -2 3.1 7.1
Slv 0.14 -0.38 -0.72 0.37 0.02 -0.45 0.23
2.3 -6.2 -9.1 4.4 0.8 -18.4 9.2
Ta 2.05 -0.12 0.19
22 -2.6 9.2
Tu 1.79 -1.18 0.36 -0.25 0.26
21.1 -17 3.5 -6.3 13.6
Ukr 2.08 -0.82 -1.9 1.27 -0.23 -0.24 0.14
28.9 -14 -21.8 14.8 -6.8 -5.1 8.9
* For each country, coefficients appear in first line, t-values in the second. The dummy coefficients for
each country stem from a regression, which only contains the respective transition economy (for which a
dummy is defined) plus the rest of the world (without all the other transition countries). Italics indicate
BALKAN countries, bold letters refer to CEE8, and the rest is part of the CIS-dummy.20
Table A.3: Robustness test for commercial energy use
GNPpcPPP GNPpc^2 Indu VA Indu Empl.
(male)
CEE8 BALK CIS R2
Commercial
energy use
p.c. kg of oil
equiv. 96
-2.32****
(-3.3)
0.18****
(4.6)
0.51****
(3.1)
0.82***
*
(5.3)
0.61**
(2.2)
0.80
(3.0)
0.80
Commercial
energy use
p.c. kg of oil
equiv. 96
-1.82***
(-2.5)
0.15****
(3.7)
0.08
(0.6)
0.78***
*
(5.6)
0.25
(0.8)
0.80****
(3.1)
0.79
N.B.: See the notes to Table A.1. Results for ASEAN dummy not reported here.
Table A4: Overall outliers*
Lower 5% Upper 5%
Burkina Armenia
Hong Kong Azerbaijan
Ethiopia Belarus
Mali Bulgaria
Congo Dem Rep
Cuba
Georgia
Guinea-Bissau
Kazakhstan
Russia
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
* Given a standard normal distribution, the countries that realise residuals greater than +1.64 or smaller
than –1.64 belong to the upper respectively lower 5% of the distribution.
Figure A.F1: CEE outliers and reform progress
Source: Own calculations and EBRD (1998)
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A.7 List of variables
World Bank data:
Male employment in industry as share in male labour force, 1990-97
Female employment in industry as share in female labour force, 1990-97
Industry value added as share in GDP, 1997
Manufacturing value added as share in GDP, 1997
Commercial energy use p.c. kg of oil equivalent, 1996
Gross secondary school enrolment 1996
Gross tertiary school enrolment 1996
Infrastructure:
Paved roadnet (km of paved roads per km
2 of country size) 1996 (World Road Statistics
1998)
Railnet (km of rail per km
2 of country size) 1996 (CIA Factbook 1998)
Financial sector: based on International Financial Statistics from the IMF:
M2 as a share in GDP, 1997
Credit to private sector as share of GDP, 1997
Interest rate spread: the rate charged by banks on loans to prime customers minus the interest
rate paid on deposits, 1997
Institutional framework for market economy:
Corruption Index 1998 (Transparency International)
Euromoney country credit-worthiness rating, September 1997
Institutional Investor credit rating, September 1997
Composite International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) rating, December 1997
Index of Economic Freedom 1999 (Heritage Foundation)
Complete list of variables and definitions available upon request.22
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